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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a pricing model for health care markets wherein
providers and patients play a Nash bargaining game. In this game,
bargaining power is interpreted as a measure of market structure. Thus,
marginal cost pricing (monopoly pricing) can be shown as the out-
come of the absence of bargaining power among providers (patients).
The model is then extended to explain how, in health care markets with
imperfect information, discrete technology choices are made by pro-
viders and how such choices may drive observed pricing behavior
such as price discrimination.
INTRODUCTION
The idea that health care providers charge noncompetitive prices has long been
established, at least since Kessel (1958) noted the price-discriminating tendencies
of physicians in the US.  This arose from the observation that competitive condi-
tions such as absence of barriers to entry and costless information hardly exist in
health care markets, a belief further strengthened by evidence of significant profits
from health care provision (for instance, Newhouse 1970 and Pauly and
Satterthwaite 1981).
Should noncompetitive prices be a cause for concern? In so far as prices
serve to signal good quality or to channel investment resources toward the provi-
sion of services whose benefits outweigh their costs, rents are not an issue.  A
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problem arises, however, when deviations from the marginal cost mainly serve to
redistribute resources from the patient to the health care provider.  Any effort to
identify the appropriate set of policy interventions to address noncompetitive
pricing patterns in health care markets must begin with a positive analysis of
price-setting behavior.  How do hospitals and physicians set prices? How do
they arrive at seemingly complex pricing structures? Why do they resort to such
pricing practices?
Numerous hypotheses regarding pricing behavior have been advanced to
date. Many of the pricing models that have generated these hypotheses assume
that health care providers are active price setters while patients are mere price
takers. A common approach is to proceed from standard pricing theory under
monopolistic competition and then motivate departures from the standard results
by invoking the unique features of the market.
This paper proposes an alternative approach to understanding pricing be-
havior of health care providers.  It presents the idea that the observed price of a
medical service can be viewed as the outcome of bargaining between a provider
and a patient.  As shown by Ellis and McGuire (1990, “EM” hereafter), the interac-
tion between a physician and a patient can be modeled as a bargaining situation.
Both players agree on a budget but, in general, a physician and a patient will differ
in terms of their desired number of treatment units within a single visit. On the one
hand, the physician might want a patient to undergo more diagnostic procedures
to minimize the cost of malpractice suits. On the other hand, where medical care is
inconvenient, time consuming, and painful, patients would want less of it.  It is
further assumed that both players know all possible treatment levels. If agents
agree to resolve the disagreement through a Roth-Nash solution (1977), the bar-
gaining outcome would simply be the weighted average of the physician’s desired
treatment level and the patient’s desired treatment level with the weights reflecting
the agents’ bargaining powers.  This paper proceeds in a similar fashion, modeling
a bargaining game of the physician-patient interaction but assuming instead that
the object of the disagreement is price. The bargaining outcome, if agents agree on
a Nash (1950) solution, is the weighted average of the maximum price that the
patient is willing to pay and the minimum price that the physician is willing to
accept for a fixed treatment level.
Modeling pricing behavior as a bargaining game has several advantages.
First, use of a pricing model allows one to be faithful to an institutional setting
where prices are basically market-determined and where health care institutions
are slowly moving toward the practice of bargaining in order to set prices. In the
health insurance sector, for instance, insurers have increased their reliance on
negotiating prices with health care providers as a means to control costs. With a
widening membership base, insurers will be in a better position to bargain forPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2006 164
provider discretion.  This assumption can also be motivated by viewing health
care as a bundle of services, including diagnostic services, drugs, professional
services, and hospital stay. Each illness will require different combinations of
medical services and the unique bundle of services specified for a particular
illness can be considered “standard” especially when payments by, say, insur-
ance carriers are made for such bundles rather than for individual services (as
with case payments).
The health care provider and consumer are assumed to have access to com-
plete information. Both can identify illness states, thus, bargaining over is not
necessary. Moreover, the set of standard treatment protocols,  , is known by
all agents. For the rest of the paper, the subscript 
  } { i X
 i  is suppressed for notational
convenience.
Bargaining agents
The market for  consists of  
 
providers and   patients. While bargaining
typically takes place between the patient and the health care provider, bargaining
may also occur between third parties that agree to represent the patient and the
provider. To simplify matters, it is assumed that all third-party agents have full




Third-party agents are not precluded from representing more than one health
care provider or patient. Let M and  denote the number of providers and pa-
tients, respectively, that a particular third-party agent represents. If all patients
have a single payer who negotiates with providers—say, a social insurance
scheme— then 
 
. Similarly, if all hospitals belong to a single hospital
association that represents all its member hospitals in price negotiations, then




An individual who falls ill considers seeking treatment from a health care facility.
All health care providers will prescribe a standard set of treatment protocols, X ,
which is known to the patient. Thus, when the agents are face-to-face, they know
exactly what to buy or to sell but have no idea what the price is. The price,  , is
determined through a bargaining process.
Agents are assumed to undergo an implicit search process.  Each patient
attempts to bargain with all  providers, but eventually transacts with the
provider from whom the most bargaining gains can be obtained.   th m
  0 X
In each encounter, agents face an “all-or-nothing” choice: either the bargain
is consummated by a transaction or it is not. To the patient, the no-bargain option
implies resorting to home care, denoted by  . To the provider, it means having
to rely on other sources of income, say, interest earnings.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2006 170
Based on the aforementioned assumptions,
Definition.  A contract arises between the  provider and the   pa-
tient if
th m th n
* * M N ⋅
(i) the  provider’s most preferred patient is the patient; and
(ii) the patient’s most preferred provider is the  provider.
The equilibrium in the bargaining model is therefore akin to that in implicit markets,
where agents are matched according to their individual preferences.  The total
number of contracts is at most equal to  .
PRICING, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY CHOICE
A number of patterns of technology use are distinctly characteristic of medical
care markets. Unlike in most industries where a single technology—generally, the
most cost-effective one—would tend to dominate, alternative technologies are
observed to co-exist in medical care markets. These technologies usually pose a
trade-off between cost and quality, higher quality care being more expensive. In
this section, the bargaining model is extended in an attempt to explain these atypi-
cal patterns of technology choice.
The assumption of perfect information is relaxed to depict the more realistic
scenario where health care providers are unable to observe patient incomes accu-
rately. The bargaining model predicts that certain pricing rules require an invest-
ment in a wide range of so-called “half-way” technologies.
Thomas (1975) defined “half-way” technologies as those falling between
two extreme categories: “nontechnologies” and “high technology.”
Nontechnologies are those that have no capacity to treat a patient but will
entail minimal resources.  An example is treatment of AIDS patients, which
consists of confinement for whatever symptoms that may emerge and to ease
the psychological pain of the prospect of death. On the other hand, high tech-
nologies are those that seek to prevent, rather than cure, disease. These are
likewise the cheapest forms of medical care. Immunization is an example of a
high technology. Half-way types are generally successful at extending life but
are unable to bring patients to complete recovery. Many of these are expensive
protocols, as exemplified by organ transplantation, coronary artery bypass sur-
gery, and chemotherapy. There are also half-way technologies that are less
costly but might entail inconveniences like pain and other adverse side-effects.
The Thomas typology is adopted in the model, which is re-cast in the follow-
ing context. Suppose that for each illness i , there are   alternative technolo-
gies,  of which are available in the market: TQUIMBO 175
Proposition 3.
When price-discriminating health care providers have sufficiently large market
power but are unable to observe patient incomes, they invest in alternative half-
way technologies.
Proof.
A health care provider can exercise price discrimination under three conditions,
namely: (i) the market is composed of patients with varying incomes; (ii) the
health care provider has market power (α  is less than one); and (iii) the health
care provider observes income differences (see, for example, Phlips 1988). By
Lemma 1, when condition (iii) is not met, the health care provider can resort to
inferring patient’s income from his choice of technology. More expensive and
more effective medical technologies will be preferred by richer patients. Con-
versely, cheaper technologies with less health benefits will be chosen by poorer
patients. Thus, the health care provider who is unable to observe patient in-
comes will find it beneficial to invest in a range of half-way technologies to
facilitate market segmentation.
Explaining evidence on price discrimination via bargaining
If technology choices are indeed driven by pricing behavior under imperfect infor-
mation, then the incentive to invest in cost-effective technology could be weak in
a market with heterogeneous patients whose incomes are sufficiently large. While
this hypothesis has yet to be subjected to rigorous empirical testing, some obser-
vations on physician behavior in the Philippines at least do not contradict this
hypothesis. For example, while Directly Observed Treatment Short Course is the
most cost-effective treatment for tuberculosis patients, less than one-third of pri-
vate physicians use this protocol (Kraft et al. 2005).  Moreover, there is evidence
that health care providers in both public and private sectors engage in price dis-
crimination (De la Paz Kraft 1997; Gertler and Solon 1998). Regression results
presented by Gertler and Solon (1998) could be interpreted as indirect support for
price discrimination via technology choices. From their results, it can be noted that
the implicit price of surgical procedures is about five times greater in private hos-
pitals than in public hospitals. This implies that patients who choose to seek care
in private hospitals, which are presumably more technologically advanced, tend to
pay more for a surgical procedure than users of public hospitals, where cheaper
and traditional treatment protocols are the dominant technology types.  The same
pattern can be seen for radiological examinations and physician visits. In other
words, if facility choices can be viewed in a broad sense as technology choices,
then patients who prefer private hospitals over public hospitals tend to be richer
and thus, face higher charges.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2006 176
CONCLUSION
This paper proposes that pricing behavior can be explained via a bargaining
model. If providers and patients agree on a Nash (1950) solution, the price can be
shown to be the weighted average of the maximum price that the patient is
willing to pay and the minimum price that the physician is willing to accept for a
fixed treatment level, where the weights reflect the level of competitiveness in
the market.
This simple bargaining model is then extended to show that the observed
utilization patterns of medical technology are the result of imperfect information
and imperfect market structures. Why do alternative technologies exist? The
results of the model indicate that health care providers invest in a wide range of
substitutable technologies to facilitate price discrimination when patient incomes
are not observable. For this menu of technologies to be an effective filter of
patient incomes, the technologies must pose a trade-off between quality and
cost. Given this supply of half-way technologies, the model predicts that no
single technology will dominate.
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